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Abstract: On traditional information markets (TIMs), rewards are tied to the occurrence (or non-
occurrence) of events external to the market, such as some particular candidate winning an election. 
For that reason, they can only be used when it is possible to wait for some external event to resolve 
the market. In cases involving long time-horizons or counterfactual events, this is not an option. 
Hence, the need for a self-resolving information market (SRIM), resolved with reference to factors 
internal to the market itself. In the present paper, we first offer some theoretical reasons for thinking 
that, since the only thing that can be expected to be salient to all participants on a SRIM is the content 
of the question bet on, a convention will arise of taking that question at face value, and betting 
accordingly, in which case trading behaviour on SRIMs can be expected to be identical to that on 
TIMs. This is the ‘face value’ hypothesis. If this hypothesis holds, SRIMs have the potential of 
incorporating the accuracy of TIMs while shedding their limitations in relation to long-term 
predictions and the evaluation of counterfactuals. We then report on a laboratory experiment that 
demonstrates that trading behaviour can indeed come out highly similar across SRIMs and TIMs. As 
such, the study can be thought of as an experimental case study on SRIMs. Finally, we discuss some 
limitations of the study, and also points towards fruitful areas of future research in light of our results. 
 
Key words: Information markets; Prediction markets; Self-resolving information markets; long-term 
information markets; Counterfactuals; Experimental information markets 
 
1. Introduction 
Information markets, also known as prediction markets, are markets for placing bets on future or 
otherwise unknown events.1 On what we might call traditional information markets (TIMs), rewards 
are tied to the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of events external to the market, such as some 
particular candidate winning an election, a central bank raising or lowering the interest rate by some 
specific amount, and so forth. This creates clear incentives to bet in accordance with what one takes 
the relevant facts to be. If one does, and one is right, one sees a good return. As a result, those in the 
                                                
 
1 We prefer the term ‘information markets’ to the more popular ‘prediction markets,’ since the latter gives the 
mistaken impression that such markets are restricted to the domain of forecasting, despite being at least in 
principle capable of assigning probabilities to a range of unknown events, not restricted to future ones, including 
events in the past or (as we shall see) counterfactual events. 




know have good reason to reveal their knowledge on TIMs, and will in so doing profit—by way of a 
financial return (on real-money markets) or simply through the gratification of being shown to be 
right (on play-money markets)—from the liquidity provided by those who happen to be less informed 
on the relevant matters (Ahlstrom-Vij 2016). 
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that the price signals arising on such markets, if 
interpreted as probability assignments, generally constitute good approximations of the likelihood of 
events in a wide range of areas (Hahn and Tetlock 2006), including politics (Berg and Rietz 2014; 
Berg, Nelson, and Rietz 2008; Forsythe et al. 1998), sports (Luckner, Schröder, and Slamka 2008; 
Deschamps and Gergaud 2007; Debnath et al. 2003), business (O’Leary 2011; Chen and Plott 2002; 
Spann and Skiera 2003), medicine and health care (Rajakovich and Vladimirov 2009; Polgreen et al. 
2007; Mattingly and Ponsonby 2004), and entertainment (McKenzie 2013; Pennock et al. 2001).2 
At the same time, for reasons that will be discussed in Section 2, there is an obvious limitation 
to TIMs: they can only be used when it is possible to wait for some external event to resolve the 
market. In some cases, such as those involving very long time-horizons or counterfactual events, this 
is not an option. This motivates the introduction, in Section 3, of a type of market that has not 
received sufficient attention in the literature: a self-resolving information market (SRIM), resolved 
with reference to factors internal to the market itself. While ‘the fundamentals of the concept [of a 
TIM] have been sufficiently understood’ (104), as noted by Horn and colleagues (2014) in their 
extensive literature review, SRIMs have received almost no attention in the literature.3 We therefore 
start out below by offering some theoretical reasons for thinking that SRIMs will take the form of a 
particular type of (impure) coordination game. Specifically, since the only thing that can be expected 
to be salient to all participants on a SRIM is the content of the question bet on, a convention will arise 
of taking that question at face value, and betting accordingly, in which case trading behaviour on 
SRIMs can be expected to be identical to that on TIMs. We refer to this as the ‘face value’ hypothesis. 
If this hypothesis holds, it would be highly significant, as it would mean that SRIMs have the 
potential of incorporating the accuracy of TIMs while shedding their limitations in relation to long-
term predictions and the evaluation of counterfactuals. This is the motivation for the laboratory 
experiment discussed in Sections 4 and 5—an experiment we ran in order to add to a virtually non-
existent, experimental literature on SRIMs.4 While underpowered for purposes of statistical inference, 
our results demonstrate that trading behaviour can come out sufficiently similar across SRIMs and 
TIMs. As such, the study can be thought of as an experimental case study on SRIMs. Finally, Section 
6 discusses some limitations of the study, and also points towards fruitful areas of future research on 
SRIMs in light of the study’s results. 
 
2. Challenges for Traditional Information Markets 
Many things that we want to predict take place far into the future. For example, consider the variety of 
long-term factors on which questions about the severity of climate change turns, such as the 
temperature dependent movements of seawater, in turn affecting water density, or the release of 
                                                
 
2 For comprehensive accounts of relevant literature, see Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos (2007), covering the period of 
1990 through to 2006, and Horn et al. (2014), covering the period of 2007 until 2013, as well as Klingert (2017) 
for an analysis of the publications with the highest impact on the information market literature. 
3 As we shall see, the one exception here is Abramowicz (2007). 
4 To the best of our knowledge, there has only been one experimental study on such markets, by Espinoza et al. 
(ms.) in the context of risk and vulnerability studies, the results of which are confidential on national security 
grounds. 




methane from arctic tundra. Being able to predict changes in factors such as these is crucial to 
managing the effects of climate change. Given the impressive track record of information markets, we 
would if at all possible want a way to utilise their predictive power in these and similar contexts. 
However, TIMs run into problems when implemented for purposes of predicting events far into 
the future. Specifically, Antweiler (2012) suggests that there are two main challenges for long-term 
information markets, as in markets with a time-horizon measured not in weeks or months but in years. 
The first challenge is that the long time-horizon will result in low liquidity, owing to the attention of 
traders fading over time (assuming they get involved to begin with). The second problem is that the 
opportunity costs presented by traders tying up their money for a long time, and thereby not being 
able to earn a return elsewhere, will make such markets unattractive.  
Antweiler argues that the latter problem about opportunity costs can be overcome by the market 
maker compensating traders through separate investments. But there is of course another way to avoid 
that problem: by having the market operate on the basis of play money. Several results are relevant 
here. Servan-Schreiber and colleagues (2004) found no difference in accuracy between real-money 
and play-money markets, while Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) found slightly higher levels of accuracy 
for real-money markets. McHugh and Jackson (2012) were able to explain these seemingly 
inconsistent results by showing that context matters. In particular, in markets dedicated to politics and 
sports, there is no accuracy difference between real- and play-money markets. 
That said, opting for a play-money market doesn’t address the first challenge identified by 
Antweiler: that the market will suffer from low liquidity, owing to there being too great a discrepancy 
between the long time-horizon of the market and the short attention span of potential traders. One way 
of meeting this challenge, however, is offered by Graefe and Weinhardt (2008), who resolve contracts 
on long-term markets with reference to the outcome of separate markets consisting exclusively of 
expert traders. This manner of resolution drastically reduces the market’s time-horizon, and thereby 
avoids not only the problems of opportunity costs, but also that of waning interests on the part of 
potential traders over time.  
However, the limitations of Graefe and Weinhardt’s approach are fairly obvious. For one thing, 
it requires us to always run two markets, with two sets of traders, instead of one. For another—and 
more importantly—their approach is only feasible in a context where we already have a good sense of 
who the experts on the relevant matters are. And in cases where we do, it is less clear why we would 
be looking to set up an information market to begin with. To see why, note that, when we talk about 
‘experts’ here, we have in mind the people who happen to be informed on the topic at hand. This 
might not coincide with the people who have, for one reason or the other (including existing power 
structures that might not track genuine competency), been designated experts. This is why 
information markets are helpful, as one of their main attractions is that they enable us to harness the 
insights of experts in contexts where we don’t necessarily know who the experts are, but where we 
trust that, whoever they are, they will reveal themselves on the market. As such, information markets 
solve what is in many contexts a notoriously difficult expert identification problem. 
Consequently, even in light of Antweiler’s and Graefe and Weinhardt’s suggestions, the 
challenge associated with setting up a market that successfully predicts events far into the future very 
much remains. 
TIMs also run into problems when trying to evaluate counterfactuals. Indeed, here we face an 
even more formidable challenge: If the main problem when it comes to predicting events far into the 
future using TIMs is that traders are unwilling to wait around until the point in time where the market 
resolves, the problem for markets trading in counterfactual events is that no such point in time exists. 
Consider an example: Had Russia not interfered in the 2016 US Presidential election, Hillary Clinton 
would have won. This statement has a truth-value, and we might be interested on getting a sense of 




what it is, in so far as we want to understand whether Russian interference changed the outcome of 
the election. But since the antecedent of the counterfactual will never come out true—if Russia 
interfered in the 2016 election (and that much seems established), it will never be the case that they 
did not—it is simply not an option to set up a market that is settled by waiting for the antecedent to 
come true, and then evaluating the consequent.5 For that reason, it is arguably impossible to set up a 
TIM concerned with counterfactual events such as these. 
Here, we need to be careful not to confuse counterfactuals with (indicative) conditionals, such 
as If Hillary Clinton runs again, she will lose. Setting aside the problems considered a moment ago in 
relation to long time-horizon, we can here set up a TIM using conditional contracts. As discussed by 
Hanson (2013), such contracts are traded conditional on the antecedent of the relevant conditional 
statement (e.g., Clinton runs again). If the event does not come to pass, the trades are called off, and 
everyone is paid back whatever they have staked. Nevertheless, as Hanson points out, until such a 
time, trading on the relevant markets ‘gives us speculator estimates on the consequences of events that 
never actually happen; until speculators know an event won’t happen, they can have incentives to 
accurately estimate its consequences’ (159). It follows from this that there cannot be any incentives of 
such a kind in relation to counterfactual events, as the antecedents by definition will never come out 
true over time, and traders know this. 
Still, the fact that important decisions hang on our being able to make accurate judgments about 
the probability of events far into the future, and about the likely truth-value of counterfactual 
statements, makes it worthwhile to ask whether there is still a way to harness the power of 
information markets in such contexts. In particular, given the challenges we have seen arise for TIMs, 
the question arises whether there is a way to tie rewards on information markets, not to the occurrence 
of some external event, but instead to events internal to the market. This would solve the problem of 
opportunity costs and do away with the need for a time-horizon outstripping people’s attention spans 
on long-term markets, and also avoid the need for external resolution on a market dealing with 
counterfactual events. 
 
3. Self-Resolving Markets and the ‘Face Value’ Hypothesis 
One way to set up such a self-resolving information market is by having markets be settled on the 
basis of the final market price at some pre-specified time, unknown to the participants. So, instead of 
rewarding participants to the extent that their bets have helped push the price signal towards the ‘true’ 
value—which on a binary market will be either 0 or 1—a self-resolving market will reward 
participants to the extent that they have pushed the price signal towards whatever price the market 
closes at. The challenge for anyone wishing to implement such a market, however, is that we 
currently lack any reason to construe a person’s willingness to place any particular bet on such a 
SRIM as revealing an estimation of the probability of any event external to the market. 
To appreciate the force of this challenge, it is helpful to consider the fact that, on a TIM, there is 
a very obvious way in which trading behaviour will be disciplined by external events. No matter what 
the market price is at present, the informed trader can rest assured that he or she will eventually be 
proven right, and compensated accordingly. Indeed, the farther off the market price is at the point that 
                                                
 
5 This is not to deny that future (or indeed past) events relating to other elections and attempts at influencing 
elections might offer evidence regarding whether the counterfactual statement in question is likely true or false, 
by making more or less likely claims about the underlying causal mechanisms. What is being denied is that such 
events can in any straightforward sense settle the relevant markets, in the manner that TIMs are traditionally 
settled by the external events mentioned in the contracts traded. 




the informed trader enters the market, the more handsome her eventual reward. By contrast, once 
market rewards are no longer tied to external events, informed traders can no longer take comfort in 
the fact that they will eventually be proven right about the external event (supposedly) bet on—
because for all they know they might not. Consequently, if enough (potentially misinformed) traders 
take the market in some particular direction, the informed trader might have no choice but to bet, not 
against the background of her best estimate of the likelihood of the external event, but in accordance 
with her expectations about where the market will eventually end up at the point of self-resolution. 
The worry, then, is that there are reasons to believe that SRIMs will simply take the form of a 
‘Keynesian beauty contest,’ where we, as Keynes put it, ‘devote our intelligences to anticipating what 
average opinion expects the average opinion to be’ (Keynes 2015/1936: 211), and in so doing end up 
making judgments that might very well be completely divorced from any considerations external to 
those opinions. 
That said, there are also some considerations suggesting that this is not what will happen. To 
begin with, some highly successful self-resolved markets already exist, namely stock markets. Pay-
offs on stock markets are not determined through some great closing event, where the ‘correct’ value 
of each stock is revealed, but are a function of continuous bets on what people will be prepared to pay 
for what in the future. This is a form of self-resolution: pay-offs are a function of a feature internal to 
the market, namely market price. Despite Keynes’s concerns—after all, Keynes’s beauty contest was 
supposed to illustrate a worry he had about stock markets—trades are by convention often grounded 
in fundamentals. We treat good fundamentals as having a positive impact on share prices, and expect 
that others will do the same—and shares rise as a result. So, while internally resolved, stock markets 
offer clear incentives to those in the know to reveal their knowledge by trading.  
We want to stress that we do not believe that SRIMs will function exactly like stock markets. 
Still, it’s helpful to keep in mind the convention to factor in fundamentals on stock markets when 
considering our hypothesis. Because what we hypothesize is that people on SRIMs will bet with an 
eye towards the relevant external facts on SRIMs on account of such markets developing into a 
particular type of coordination game (Abramowicz 2007; see also Schelling 1960 and Lewis 1969). 
How so? For one thing, since the market price is a function of the sum of bets, this creates clear 
incentives to bet in accordance with expectations of how other people will be trading. However, note 
that SRIMs aren’t pure coordination games; partly, they’re also games of conflict (Ahlstrom-Vij ms.). 
Specifically, on the type of market scoring rule used on many information markets, high rewards are 
given to those who take high risks by moving the market a significant distance towards the ‘correct’ 
value (e.g., Hanson 2007). In the case of SRIMs, that means being the first person to predict what 
people will be coordinating on, and thereby getting a first mover advantage.  
Of course, successfully predicting the bets of others requires making certain assumptions about 
what considerations they are bringing to bear on their bets. So, what should participants assume on 
that score? Appreciating what type of game they are playing, they will realize that successful 
coordination requires the considerations to be salient to everyone involved. This brings us to our 
hypothesis: 
 
The ‘Face Value’ Hypothesis (FVH): Since the only thing that can be expected to be salient to 
all participants on a SRIM is the content of the question bet on, a convention will arise of taking 
that question at face value, and betting accordingly. 
 
The FVH is significant because, if it is true, we can expect similar trading behaviour on SRIMs as on 
TIMs—in both cases, people will bet with reference to what they take the relevant facts to be. If that 
is so, we can moreover construe a willingness to place a bet on a SRIM as revealing an estimation 




about the likelihood of the relevant external event, in much the same way that we do on a TIM. And, 
importantly, given that TIMs tend to generate accurate outputs, the same will thereby go for SRIMs, 
which will then have all the benefits of TIMs while lacking a significant drawback in not requiring 
external resolution. 
 
4. Evaluating the Face Value Hypothesis 
How plausible is the FVH? Aforementioned argument regarding SRIMs as (impure) coordination 
games gives us some theoretical reasons to assume that it holds, but on their own these reasons are too 
weak to support a well-grounded expectation about trading behaviour. Add to this the fact that the 
experimental literature on SRIMs is, as already noted, extremely thin. To the best of our knowledge, 
there has only been one experimental study on such markets, by Espinoza and colleagues (ms.) in the 
context of risk and vulnerability studies, the results of which are confidential due to incorporating 
information sensitive on national security grounds, but supposedly consistent with the FVH 
(Espinoza, personal communication). 
Using a platform developed by Dysrupt Labs, we therefore ran an experimental study, the 
object of which was two-fold: first, to remedy the complete absence of any publicly available, 
experimental data on SRIMs; and, second, to evaluate the FVH specifically by comparing trading 
behaviour on markets identical in all respects, save for the fact that half were externally resolved and 
half were self-resolved. If the FVH holds, we should expect such behaviour to be very similar across 
relevant metrics (more on these below). 
 
4.1. Methodology 
Six participants—four students at the University of Kent in Canterbury, UK (where one of the 
experimenters was based at the time), and two professionals in Melbourne, Australia (where the other 
experimenter was based)—were recruited on the basis of a participant information sheet introducing 
the study as follows:6 
 
You’ve been invited to participate in abovementioned study on information markets. An information 
market is a market for placing bets on the occurrence or non-occurrence of future or otherwise unknown 
events. The price signals arising on such markets tend to offer good approximations of the likelihood of 
the events bet on. So, for example, if the market price for a contract worth £1 if the Conservatives win 
an outright majority in the upcoming general election in the U.K. is 80p, the market can be taken to 
suggest that the event in question is 80% likely. But there’s an obvious limitation to such markets: they 
can only be used when waiting for some external event to resolve the market is an option. Sometimes it 
isn’t, such as in the case of events far into the future, or counterfactual events. This raises the question 
whether there’s a way to tie rewards, not to the occurrence of some external event, but instead to 
events internal to the market, making for a self-resolving market. That’s the question we hope to 
answer as part of this study. 
 
On the day of the study (July 19, 2017), the participants were randomly allocated into groups of three 
to either a TIM or an otherwise identical SRIM. We did this over the course of ten questions, or 
‘rounds,’ with a new random allocation of participants for each round. While randomly allocated to 
either a SRIM or a TIM for each question, the participants were aware of what type of market they 
were participating in, once allocated, owing to each market being marked either [TRADITIONAL 
MARKET] or [SELF-RESOLVING MARKET] at the top of the interface. This is because we wanted to know 
                                                
 
6 Full participant information sheet, signed consent forms, and institutional decision on ethical approval from 
the University of Kent, Canterbury, are all available upon request. 




how participants bet on markets when knowing full well how their bets were being rewarded. For this 
purpose, each participant was also asked to watch a 9-minute video tutorial (available on request) 
prior to taking part in the study, explaining how to navigate the platform and spending two minutes 
explaining the difference between TIMs and SRIMs. 
Each market question concerned the probability of drawing a black ball out of an urn with a 
particular distribution of black and white balls, set by the experimenters to a value unknown to the 
participants. On the platform, the participants in traditional markets where prompted as follows: 
 
[TRADITIONAL MARKET]  
If a ball were to be drawn from the urn, what's the probability that it would be a black ball? 
Imagine that there is an urn with black and white balls in it. If we were to draw a ball from the urn at 
random, what’s the probability that a black ball would be drawn?7 
 
The prompt for the self-resolving markets was identical, save for those markets being designated as 
self-resolving as opposed to traditional in the heading. 
At one-minute intervals, participants received different samples randomly drawn (with 
replacement) from the distribution (e.g., ‘A white ball was just drawn from the urn, before being put 
back’). They could then choose to factor in those samples—together with whatever samples they 
might take the market to be aggregating through other participants’ bets—in their bets, using a limited 
number of points (1,000) allocated at the start of each round. 
The markets used a standard version of Hansons’s market scoring rule (e.g., Hanson 2007), 
sequentially rewarding participants to the extent that they, through their bets, move the price signals 
towards the correct value, less any reward that is due to past participants moving the market in the 
same direction. The rewards structure on TIMs was explained to the participants as follows: 
 
How will my bets be rewarded?  
If there are far more black than white balls in the urn, the probability of drawing a black ball is high; if 
there are far more white than black, then it's low. When the market closes, bets will therefore be 
measured against the actual proportion of black balls (i.e., 0-100%) in the urn from which you've 
received samples—although you won't find out what that proportion is until the end, when the market 
has closed. 
 
This explanation appeared right below the above prompt on each traditional market. The 
corresponding explanation for the SRIMs was as follows: 
 
How will my bets be rewarded?  
If there are far more black than white balls in the urn, the probability of drawing a black ball is high; if 
there are far more white than black, then it's low. But here we imagine that there's no way of knowing 
the proportion of black (or white) balls in the urn. All we can do is draw samples from it and send them 
over to you. When the market closes, bets will therefore be measured, not against the unknown 
proportion of black balls, but against the market price at the time of closing. This price represents the 
market's judgment on the probability that a black ball would be drawn, in light of the samples 
aggregated on the market through the bets placed by you and others. 
 
                                                
 
7 This prompt might be taken as a counterexample to our claim from earlier (in Section 2) to the effect that we 
cannot evaluate counterfactuals by way of TIMs. But note that what the question ultimately asks about is a 
probability, which in turn is interpreted as an actual (not counterfactual) proportion, as per the rewards prompt 
for the TIMs below. 




In other words, our aim was to make the two parallel markets identical—with the same underlying 
distribution of black balls, same samples being communicated to the participants, and so forth—save 
for the manner in which the bets were rewarded. 
Every market resolved at a random point in time between 60 and 120 seconds after the fifth and 
final sample had been sent out. A crucial aspect of the design was that participants were completely 
unaware of when the market would close; indeed, they were not even informed about aforementioned 
time interval. This was important—and will likely be important for the design of successful SRIMs 
more generally—since we wanted to avoid participants on the SRIMs trying to increase their reward 
by placing a large bet at the very final moment of the market, thereby guaranteeing that they, being 
the final mover of the market, would be correct about where the market ends up at closing. There was 
of course nothing that prevented them from still trying to time their final bets in that manner, although 
not without running the risk of being wrong about exactly when the market is to close, and as such 
potentially being punished by further bets by others. In that respect, there was a fairly strong incentive 
against such timed bets. 
Each participant was allocated a £10 incentive for participating in the study. For any individual 
participant, that sum could be increased when augmented with the pay-outs of successful trading on 
the markets—i.e., trading that pushed the market price towards the value representing the underlying 
distribution of black balls, in the case of the TIMs, and towards whatever the market price ends up 
being at the time of resolution, for the SRIMs—with the total gains and losses across markets offering 
an exchange rate between market points and money of 100 points per £1. However, participants could 
also lose their incentives if they engaged in poor trading. This was to discourage destructive trading 
where participants, knowing they will be guaranteed £10, start betting without any regard for potential 
losses. (Under no circumstances could the participants walk away owing any money.) 
 
4.2. Results 
As for our findings, it is important to note at the outset what we did not take the study to be able to 
demonstrate. Given the sample size (twenty markets in total, with ten markets per condition), the 
power was too low for us to detect any statistically significant differences between the two conditions 
(i.e., SRIM and TIM). Consequently, even if there are in fact differences between trading behaviour 
on SRIMs and TIMs in general, that is not something we could necessarily expect to pick up on 
within the framework of the present study. 
So, what can the study help demonstrate? Whether trading behaviour can come out sufficiently 
similar across the two conditions, as investigated through an experimental case study on a particular 
(small) sample of TIMs and SRIMs. Anyone sceptical about such self-resolution, perhaps on account 
of suspicions (outlined in Section 3 above) that SRIMs will quickly collapse into Keynesian beauty 
contests, should expect not, and should correspondingly be surprised if the similarity comes out 
high—or, failing that, at the least be sufficiently intrigued to agree that the matter warrants further 
investigation. 
Similarity with respect to what? The metrics used were as follows: 
 
4.2.1. Comparative Volatility 
If participants on a SRIM are coordinating on the question asked and taking it at face value, in much 
the same way as they would on a TIM, the volatility on SRIMs should be roughly equivalent to that 
on TIMs. Following the established practice of measuring stock volatility by way of standard 
deviation, we used the same measure when determining information market volatility. More 
specifically, using the prices at every second from the first bet as our price points, volatility was 
calculated as follows: 










Using this measure, the average volatility of the TIMs and SRIMs in the study was not only relatively 
low, but as it turns out also identical between the two conditions: .17. 
 
4.2.2. Market Profile Similarity 
If trading behaviour on TIMs and SRIMs is for all practical purposes identical—and, in particular, if 
people under both conditions are trading with reference to the external facts referenced in the question 
asked, as per the FVH—the market profiles developing under the two conditions can be expected to 
be similar. To measure similarity of market profiles, we used an inversed squared-distance measure, 
where ‘𝑝:;’ corresponds to the price at time t for market a, and ‘𝑝:<’ the same for market b, with i being 
incremented every second of the market, starting with the point at which a bet had happened on both 
markets: 
 







Two markets whose price graphs match each other perfectly will have a similarity score of 1, while 
two markets whose prices constantly are at the opposite ends will have a similarity score of 0. As for 
operationalizing the idea of two market profiles being ‘similar’, it’s helpful to consider the markets in 
the study’s first round by way of a benchmark: 
 
GRAPH 1. MARKET PROFILES FOR ROUND 1 
 
Prices given for ‘Yes’ on the question ‘If a ball were to be drawn from the urn, what’s the 
probability that it would be a black ball?’ 
 
The two markets in Graph 1 have what would have to be considered similar market profiles, and on 
the above measure the similarity score does indeed come out high: .988. Comparing that score to the 
average score across all ten rounds—.975—makes clear that the markets generally came out similar 
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4.2.3. Final Price Similarity 
While it is interesting to note the high average market profile similarity score, we were to some extent 
more interested in whether the respective markets would end up at the same (final) price, whether 
they took the same routes there. For that reason, we also calculated the similarity score specifically for 
the final market prices as follows, where ‘𝑝;’ corresponds to the final market price on market a, and 
‘𝑝<’ the same for market b: 
 
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 1 − (𝑝; − 𝑝<)5 
 
Here, too, it’s helpful to use the markets in Graph 1 as a benchmark, as they closed at 21.54% in the 
case of the TIM and 22.93% in the case of the SRIM—closing prices that would have to be 
considered similar. Indeed, using the above measure, the final market price similarity score for round 
1 came out to .999. As can be seen in Table 1, round 1 was not an outlier in this respect, given that the 
average final market price similarity score across the experiment’s ten rounds came out to .966, with 
an SD of .005:  
 
TABLE 1. FINAL MARKET PRICE SIMILARITY 









































    
 AVERAGE SIMILARITY: .966 
 SD: .005 
 
All prices given for ‘Yes’ on the question ‘If a ball were to 
be drawn from the urn, what’s the probability that it would 
be a black ball?’ 
 




In getting some intuitive purchase on the similarity score used, it’s helpful to note that the average 
similarity score of .966 corresponds to an average divergence of 20 percentage points. As can be 
gleaned from Table 1, in only one instance (round 9) did we see any substantial divergence, with the 
two markets closing at 72.32% and 24.32%, respectively, making for a final market price similarity 
score of .770 for that particular round, corresponding to a divergence of 48 percentage point. 
(Factoring out that particular round makes for an average similarity score of .988, corresponding to an 
average divergence of 11 percentage points.) However, when we turn to our final metric, we shall see 
that this divergence actually reflects well on the SRIM in question. 
 
4.2.4. Comparative Accuracy 
The final metric we looked at was accuracy, measured by way of the mean squared errors of the final 
market prices, compared to the actual distributions of black balls in the corresponding (virtual) urns 
from which the samples communicated to the participants were randomly drawn. The squared errors 
of the final market prices were as follows:  
 
TABLE 2. SQUARED ERRORS 


















































Self-resolving 97.74% .006 
  
  
 AVERAGE ERROR FOR TRADITIONAL MARKETS: .033 
AVERAGE ERROR FOR SELF-RESOLVING MARKETS: .012 
 
Prices given for ‘Yes’ on the question ‘If a ball were to be drawn from the 
urn, what's the probability that it would be a black ball?’; distributions 
correspond to the actual distribution of black balls in the (virtual) urn. 
 




As can be seen from Table 2, the squared errors for the markets were relatively low, and moreover 
lower for the SRIMs than the TIMs. An average squared error of .012 for the SRIMs corresponds to 
an average error of 11 percentage points. By contrast, the average error of .033 on the TIMs 
corresponds to an average error of 18 percentage points. In other words, to the extent that the SRIMs 
deviated on average in their final market prices from those on the TIMs, the former were more 
accurate than the latter.8 It is interesting to note, in particular, that in the case of the only two markets 
where there is a substantial divergence in final prices (i.e., round 9), it is the SRIM that is most 
accurate, landing at a final price of 24.32%, making for a squared distance of .001 from the actual 
distribution of 28%. 
 
5. Two Potential Confounders 
The values achieved on the above metrics are promising, as far as their consistency with the FVH is 
concerned. We therefore wanted to rule out that the similarity between the TIMs and the SRIMs 
across the experiment’s ten rounds was a mere artefact of a confounding variable. Two potential 
confounders stand out: 
First, we wanted to rule out that the participants were simply not clear on the difference 
between the two types of markets, and therefore exhibited similar trading behaviours on both for 
completely uninteresting reasons. In order to evaluate the likelihood of this being the case, we 
collected qualitative data on the participants’ understanding of the difference between the two 
markets. We did this as part of a debrief phone call with each participant two days after the study (on 
July 21, 2017), under the guise of soliciting their feedback on the platform used. As part of the phone 
call, each participant was asked to explain how they were rewarded on the two types of markets, and 
was deemed to have a clear understanding of the difference between TIMs and SRIMs if they 
responded (without further prompting) that rewards on TIMs was a function of the actual distribution 
of black balls in the (virtual) urn, while rewards on SRIMs was simply a function of the market price 
at the time of closing. Four of the six participants showed a clear understanding of the difference 
between the two markets. One of those four even, unwittingly and unprompted, summed up the FVH 
to explain why their betting strategy on the SRIMs was identical to that on the TIMs, despite the fact 
that bets were rewarded in different ways on the two types of markets: it just wasn’t clear to them 
what else they could possibly do but have their bets be informed by the samples received, and assume 
that the market price was a function of others continuously doing the same. 
Second, as we saw in Section 4.1, the instructions for the SRIMs included the following: ‘This 
[market] price represents the market’s judgment on the probability that a black ball would be drawn, 
in light of the samples aggregated on the market through the bets placed by you and others.’ Did this 
statement prompt the participants to take the question asked at face value? We have no way of ruling 
out that it did. If it did, that might mean that the similarity we saw across markets was at least partly 
due to the prompt making salient the possibility that others would take the question at face value (in 
which case, arguably, you should, too). At the same time, this would actually be good news, since it 
would suggest that getting people to take the question at face value might be quite easy—perhaps all 
you need to do is prompt them to do so, and they will. Moreover, if the prompt had an effect—and we 
                                                
 
8 In fact, if we compare the TIMs and SRIMs in terms of the average squared error for each second of the 
market from the point at which a bet has occurred on both markets—a more demanding accuracy measure than 
one framed solely in terms of the final market price, since it penalises markets for not quickly converging on the 
correct price—the SRIMs still come out more accurate, with an average squared error of .039 across all ten 
SRIMs, compared to .048 across all TIMs. 




stress that we have no way of knowing whether it did—then that might just be because the idea of 
taking the question at face value comes fairly naturally to people, which, if anything, is congenial to 
the FVH. (We will return to this matter in the next and final section.) 
In light of this, we are fairly confident that the similarity across the two types of markets in the 
study is not a mere artefact of the participants not being clear on the difference between TIMs and 
SRIMs, and that, to the extent that the similarity arose partly in response to the prompt offered, that 
would if anything be an interesting result in its own right, since it would suggest that having people 
bet in a manner that is consistent with the FVH is actually quite easy. 
 
6. Limitations and Future Work 
As mentioned at the outset, the aim of the study was two-fold: first, to remedy the complete absence 
of any publicly available, experimental data on SRIMs; and, second, to evaluate the FVH by 
determining whether trading behaviour can come out sufficiently similar across the two conditions, 
i.e., external resolution and self-resolution. The study shows that it’s clearly possible to generate 
meaningful betting on SRIMs—betting that is moreover similar to what we see on otherwise identical 
TIMs. 
As noted earlier, the sample of twenty markets was too small to enable us to determine whether 
SRIMs and TIMs will generally come out as similar as they did in this study. In order to determine 
that, we need to run a similarly designed study with a larger sample. Of course, what we will 
ultimately want to understand is under what conditions SRIMs can be expected to generate valuable 
outputs. It would make sense for future studies to look at one condition in particular: the presence of 
market manipulation. TIMs have showed a high degree of resilience in the face of manipulation 
attempts (Hanson and Oprea 2009; Hanson, Oprea, and Porter 2006; Oprea et al. 2007; Berg and 
Rietz 2014; Camerer 1998). But even if the FVH is correct, it might be that any convention on SRIMs 
to take the question at face value and bet accordingly will be undone by the slightest sign of market 
manipulation, which by definition involves trades or bets made in an attempt to move markets 
independently of the external facts referenced by the questions. Investigating the susceptibility of 
SRIMs to market manipulation will therefore be an important part of a future work on SRIMs. 
Of course, even a large sample study of this kind will be subject to the same worries that affect 
all laboratory studies regarding whether the results will generalise to naturalistic settings. This worry 
has motivated several recent studies, regarding both the comparative performance of information 
markets (e.g., Buckley 2017) and their susceptibility to manipulation (e.g., Buckley and O’Brien 
2015; Berg and Rietz 2014). For this reason, even if a future study finds support for FVH on account 
of finding that trading behaviour SRIMs and TIMs can be expected to come out sufficiently similar in 
experimental settings, it would make sense to then apply SRIMs in a non-laboratory environment, 
with non-stylised contract questions dealing with real-life decision problems. Crucially, such 
applications could not be directly comparative. Again, the very situations in which we would want to 
implement self-resolving markets are ones where the type of external resolution required for a TIM is 
not a viable option, as per what was argued in Section 2. Still, a more indirect form of comparison—
say, with the type and level of volatility we typically see on TIMs, the degree of sensitivity to 
manipulation that we tend to see on TIMs, and so forth9—would be possible and worthwhile. 
Moreover, testing SRIMs in naturalistic settings will also be crucial when it comes to having the 
                                                
 
9 We can think of these and similar features as structural features of information markets, that can be evaluated 
independently of the substantive matters bet on. 




relevant type of markets be accepted in supporting the decisions of actual practitioners, who might be 
uncomfortable with relying on support systems that have not been extensively tested in the field. 
Another factor of relevance to commercial SRIMs is question curation. In particular, it would 
be worthwhile to test whether we will see a significant difference along aforementioned metrics when 
we vary the instructions given to the participants, and specifically how much stress is put on the 
difference between TIMs and SRIMs. As noted earlier, the instructions for the SRIMs in the study 
included the claim that the price ‘represents the market’s judgment on the probability that a black ball 
would be drawn, in light of the samples aggregated on the market through the bets placed by you and 
others.’ Earlier, we raised the possibility that this might have prompted the participants to take the 
question bet on at face value. If that is so, it is possible that, the more salient the instructions make the 
difference between the two types of markets, the less similar trading behaviour on SRIMs and TIMs 
will be. This would be worth testing since any attempt to design commercial SRIMs will want to 
make sure it gets right the amount and level of detail of the instructions given to participants, for 
purposes of ensuring meaningful trading. 
These are just some questions regarding SRIMs on which future work would do well to focus 
on. Of course, there are plenty of other aspects of SRIMs that we need to gain a better understanding 
of, in addition to those mentioned here. Hopefully, if nothing else, our study will help motivate others 
to investigate these and other aspects of a type of market that, while presently not well-understood, 
potentially constitutes a powerful alternative to more traditional information markets in cases where 
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